In the United
States political power sways between two poles of ideology. These camps are
commonly referred to as conservatives or liberals. One’s political ideology is
entrenched in them often during their childhood. Yet still in any given year
the ruling party can change. If people in America are basically already divided
into their separate camps what accounts for this pendulum like swing of power?
The most significant answer is the role freedom of the press plays in
broadcasting information about candidates. In layman’s terms: the media is what
accounts for this pendulum swing. In Russia there is no such pendulum. For the
last decade, Russian power has rested in the hands of President Vladimir Putin
and those who he chooses to stand beside him in his inner circle. This
political domination by Putin has been referred to by Brian Whitmore as “The
Power Vertical”. Of upmost significance is the fact that this power vertical
largely controls and funds news organizations. However in recent months the
people have been rising up in opposition. With mass protests and a rising
prominence on the world stage the people are beginning to lay hold of their own
power. This desire of the opposition to uphold the Russian constitution,
alongside the developing culture of the youth, has created what Whitmore calls
the “Power Horizontal”. The lacking of true freedom of the press prevents
Russia from developing the Power Pendulum which exists in the United States and
other truly democratic nations.
A quick examination of the U.S.
model of politics will provide an ample context for the direction in which
Russian society is beginning to move. If we look at a common model of ideology
and politics it will become apparent the role media plays in a true democracy.
To get elected in the United States candidates in primary elections must appeal
to baseline voters and in general elections must appeal towards the center, or
the independents (Ward). And as the candidates attempt to shape the issues and
pull them in their respective directions the media observes. The media along
with organizations like the ACLU or the NRA have a bias. And as they funnel out
information it is changed to fit into their agendas. The media therefore
directly influences the general elections as the candidates try to move back
too center (Ward). The candidates try to shape the issues but really the
predisposed beliefs of the media shape what the public sees. Some news
organizations are less biased but what is significant is that they do have
freedom of the press. Also anyone, not just big news organizations, can say
whatever they want in whatever medium they can find. And us as voters have the
ability to decipher through all the various opinions. The freedom of the press
therefore opens up the ability for the people to have the final say in what
happens in the government and in society.
Therefore the fact that the state
owns the media is all the more essential when discussing Russia’s progress.
Let’s look briefly at a few examples of newspapers which are controlled by
oligarchs and the government. Komsomolskaya Pravada is controlled by tycoon
Vladimir Potanin; Kommersant was controlled by now exiled tycoon Boris
Berezovsky; Izvestia is controlled by Gazprom; Rossiyskayay Gazeta is the
official government newspaper; Krasnaya Zvezda is the defense ministry newspaper
(Smith). Concerning broadcast media Russia TV Channel and Radio Russia are the
national networks (Smith). Ekho Moskvy which is outspoken against many of the
power vertical’s policies is the one huge exception in that it too is owned by
Gazprom bank (Smith). Recent news has says that a new television station which
is supposed to model America’s PBS or England’s BBC is about to begin. It is
being billed as “Russia’s first public television channel” (The Power of
Television). Brian Whitmore however argues that it “will be far from
independent and far from free of state influence” (The Power of Television).
Newspapers are still the primary source of information, recent trends show, but
that television and internet sources are being used more and more in Russia,
interestingly 44 percent of Russians trust national stations (Smith). Yet it is
clear that “the state relies on national television channels as an invaluable
political resource. National TV effectively shapes public opinion by boosting,
playing down or ignoring any figure or event” (Lipman 2). It is clear that the
masses are taken in by such tactics. That is why Putin was able to win the
election this past March, regardless of the actual percentages most analysts
agree Putin had close to a majority. But if he is really limiting peoples civil
liberties how do so many support him? The same answer that is given for any
number of states around the world: apathy and ignorance. If 44 percent believe
the national news 44 percent will likely vote for the one that those news
stations support. What is upsetting about all this is that after the fall of
the Soviet Union real change in the media happened. The time under Yeltsin is
described as having “assertive coverage” (Gehlbach 78). Yet Gehlbach describes:
Under Putin, the once-lively
national television media became mouthpieces for the Kremlin. Top officials from the three national television
networks meet at the Kremlin every
Friday to discuss the previous week’s and next week’s news coverage. Not every story is directed from above, of course:
journalists and editors who understand their station’s
editorial policy can act with some autonomy. (Gehlbach 79)
The editorial
policy is of course support of all things pro-Kremlin, i.e., pro-Putin. This
clearly limits any actual autonomy.
This leads to Russia being “one of
five countries on the International Press Institute’s Watch List of countries ‘endangered
with becoming repressive’”(Becker 139). One event that really shows the
methodology of Putin’s encroachments on private media is his attack on Vladimir
Gusinsky’s Media-Most empire. “Through the selective application of tax and
criminal law, including the invasion of Media-Most premises by hooded and
heavily armed tax police, the direct pressure of the Ministry of Press, Radio
and Television boardroom intrigue, Media-Most collapsed” (Becker 151). This is
a clear demonstration of how methodical and successful Putin is in limiting
civil liberties. But before you can make people fear you, you must first label
a group as evil and that is exactly what Putin did in his state of the nation
address in June 2000. “He divided the media into state (gossudarstveniye) and
anti-state (anti-gossudarstveniye) and attacked private owners for turning
media into ‘mass misinformation outlets’ and ‘into a means of struggle against
the state’”(Becker 148). So to own a private media outlet is no longer just
freedom of the press, it is now in opposition to the state. Or more aptly in
opposition to Putin and therefore must be eliminated and must be silenced. As
will be examined forthcoming, all of this makes perfect strategic sense through
the lenses of Michel Foucault’s theories of power/knowledge.
Specifically the repression of
Novaya Gazeta is reminiscent of Michel Foucault’s theories. Interestingly, 51
percent of Novaya Gazeta is owned by the paper’s staff and the other 49 percent
is owned by Mikhail Gorbachev and State Duma Deputy Lebedev. In the last decade
four Novaya Gazeta journalists have died mysteriously. The murder of Anna
Politkovskaya on October 7, 2006 was the 211th death of a journalist
since the end of the Soviet Union.
October 7th also is Vladimir Putin’s birthday, which has
raised some questions regarding Kremlin involvement. This allegation however is
one that will probably never be known if it is valid. Yet there is no question
that Politkovskaya put herself in controversial situations. She spoke out
against Moscow’s brutal handling of the Second Chechen War. And what should be
noted is that regardless of one’s political opinions on this War what is at
stake here are basic civil liberties. Whether or not Politkovskaya, or as will
be examined later the band Pussy Riot, are right in their political opinions
what matters is that in a democratic state freedom of speech and freedom of the
press are essential. The irony of course being that Putin rallies behind the
banner of ‘sovereign democracy’.
In an article Politkovskaya wrote, two months
before her murder, but was published posthumously titled “Her Own Death,
Foretold” Politkovskaya makes some startling statements about her voice in
Russian politics. She observes “I am not invited to press conferences or
gatherings that Kremlin officials might attend…despite this, all the top
officials talk to me, at my request…but only in secret…like spies”
(Politkovskaya). She later goes into detail of Russian security agents
desecrating a dead Chechen body, “which is a criminal act…in full view of the
adults and children” (Politkovskaya). This story seems to serve as an example
of the type of things she reported and was persecuted for. It is reporting like
this that makes internet sites claim she is “the madwoman of Moscow”
(Politkovskaya). But what is significant is that she did go to these places and
write about these atrocities. Regardless if the laws were followed someone with
a pen observed and wrote. And this is what those in power could not tolerate.
Because they knew as she states in the final paragraph “the main thing,
however, is to get on with my job, to describe the life I see, to receive
visitors...who have nowhere else to bring their troubles…so that the only place
they can be aired is in our newspaper, Novaya Gazeta” (Politkovskaya). This is
why Novaya Gazeta journalists are persecuted and this is why Anna died, it gave
those without a voice a voice. And in a repressive state this is the ultimate
sin.
French philosopher Michel Foucault
has described at great length these relations between institutions and society
in his discourse on power/knowledge. I will examine his theory briefly to
provide the context within which it bears fruit in Russia. Foucault argued that
knowledge necessarily has someone who has a stake in it. And that through
discourse power is developed by exploiting this stake. Thereby the one with
knowledge marginalizes the one without knowledge. And through hegemony power is
kept by the dominant group. They then form ideological and repressive state
apparatus’. Ideological state apparatus’ are church, school, family, media etc.
Repressive state apparatus’ are the police, the army, the law, the government
etc. (Ingram). Ultimately it is through these institutions that power is
wielded, constantly serving the needs and desires of the dominant group.
Foucault even argues that truth is subservient to power. He states “the
important thing here is that truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in
power…truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple
forms of constraint… Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general
politics’ of truth, i.e., the status of those who are charged with saying what
counts as true” (Foucault 131). It is by this process of funneling truth to
serve the needs of those in power that allows governments to control a
populace. All of Russia’s restrictions of civil liberties work towards this end
of marginalizing the commoner and edifying the dominant group. This is why Anna
and so many other journalists have died. If one spreads knowledge to the people
which would lead to them having power they must be silenced.
Equally important as the freedom of
the press is the freedom of expression through art. The changing mass media in
the arts may be an even more effective means of toppling the power vertical.
The growing youth culture is something that the oligarchs and Putin simply
cannot understand (“The Two Russias”). It is this fear of the unknown that
keeps Putin away from online networking such as Twitter or Facebook. It is also
this fear that leads to repression of art (“The Two Russias”). However some art
seems to be intentionally controversial. For example the song “Mercedes S666”
by ‘socially conscious’ rapper Noize MC is openly antagonistic, albeit for good
reason. Another example is the recent arrest of members of the feminist punk
band Pussy Riot for their demonstrations.
Noize MC’s song “Mercedes S666” deals with the deaths of
Olga Aleksandrina and Vera Sidelnikova who died in a car accident also
involving LUKoil Vice President Anatoly Barkov. Barkov’s Mercedes was driving
in the wrong lane of traffic to avoid a traffic jam and crashed head on with Aleksandrina
and Sidelnikova. Both women lost their
lives, while Barkov only had minor injuries. Yet the women were charged with
causing the wreck. Barkov faced no repercussion. Noize’s song is spoken through
the perspective of Barkov. He states “I do not
know people whose lives are more important than my interests” (Noize MC). The
chorus echoes “Mercedes
S666/ Get out of the way, plebeian, the wheels do
not go/ Pathetic rabble tremble - on the road patricians/ We're late to hell, the way a
chariot” (Noize MC). Noize is clearly making the point that those in power do
not care about the common person. The second verse grows even more
controversial; “In hell, I’ll cook in a nearby pot of Yevsyukov/Но сейчас я жив, здоров
и по полной упакован,
But now I'm alive, healthy and full-packed/Застрахован
на все сто от происшествия любого, Insured for one hundred percent of
any accident” (Noize MC). Denis Yevsyukov is a former Moscow police officer who
has been sentenced to life imprisonment for killing two people in a supermarket
shooting spree. We must remember that Barkov was not convicted or charged with
any crime. So statements like this are clearly very controversial and Noize
knows the controversy that this song will cause. He is however a close friend
of Aleksandrina’s sister. This song is a perfect example of one voice making
some difference. The music video alone has over four hundred thousand views on
YouTube. It is this type of voice from the youth that can be constructive even
if it is controversial. And as has been discussed this slowly takes power away
from the oligarchs and puts it firmly into the voice of the people.
In
what is an even more controversial issue the current arrests of members of the
band Pussy Riot were stimulated by even more aggressive protesting. After
performing unsanctioned concerts in Red Square and Orthodox churches several
members of the band have been arrested some face several years in jail. They
are crass, yet they should have freedom of speech regardless of their message.
In their now famous “Punk Prayer” they begin with what sounds like a Orthodox
hymn singing “St. Maria, Drive away Putin” (Pussy Riot). Then the sonic
dissonance begins, a minute and a half of shrill screaming, which masks their
protest. One verse is particularly telling of their anger “Gay pride sent to
Siberia in chains/ The head of the KGB is their chief saint/ Leads protesters
to prison under escort/ In order not to offend the Holy/ Women have to give
birth and to love/ Holy shit, shit, Lord's shit!” (Pussy Riot). One can easily
see why an Orthodox church would not want this impromptu concert to take place
at their church. And one can also see how this could be viewed as illegal. It
most certainly is in America as well. But what is unnerving is the fact that
the women who were arrested may face up to seven years in prison, a Siberian
one no doubt. It seems that it is not the invasion of private property but the
content of their lyrics which they are being punished for. In a very visible
and very aggressive way they denounce the morality, validity, and even Godliness
of Putin. They ask St. Maria to drive him away and accuse him of sexism,
communism, illegal imprisonments, and hatred of minorities. They ultimately
conclude that he is excrement, (reminiscent of the term dermocracy). All elites
would likely be offended by this type of characterization. But would they all
react the same way. Would president Obama sentence a vehement protestor to
seven years of freezing torture? Likely not. In fact the very fact that these
girls have been charged with a crime and threatened with such a punishment
shows that Putin is scared of what they have to say. Again, if their voice is
heard, he must ask himself will people agree with them? Would some of his power
be taken away by allowing these girls their freedom of speech? It is clear that
to keep his prominence he must react in these ways. Pussy Riot has to be
imprisoned and Politkovskaya had to die. But there is an upshot. The landscape
of Russian society is slowly changing. Through the youths use of the internet
and mass media the way things operate are changing. People are more observant
of fraud in elections and it seems evident that this awareness will continue to
grow. As the Noize MC song points out people are more observant of injustices
around them. Likewise many have protested and made documentaries regarding the
deaths of journalists. All these apparent steps backwards are really movement
in the right direction. But as with all things Russian “everything is changing
and nothing is changing”(The Politics of Television).
Putin is therefore at the helm of a
system which is changing but which he still largely controls. Putin’s developed
authoritarianism has been necessary for his continued grasp on power. But how
did he get into this position and has it been beneficial for Russia? After the
economic collapse in Russia on August 17, 1998 Yeltsin appointed Putin as Prime
Minister (Goldman 4). He then took on the oligarchs, even more so during his
first presidential term, and began to have the state take control of Russia’s
major companies. Significantly he purchased Gazprom and the ordeal with Yukos
and Khordorkovsky is well known. Under Putin Russia now owns over fifty percent
of Gazprom’s shares (Goldman 6). But would Russia be the different if Putin was
not in the picture? Goldman argues “yes,
Russia would be different, but not because of Putin. Russia would be as rich as
it is, but that’s besides Putin” (Goldman 3). He goes on to substantiate this
by arguing that Putin has nothing to do with the rising oil prices which have
attributed to
Russia’s increased wealth. But what of Putin’s authoritarian policies? Are they
beneficial or would a more democratic system be more beneficial for the Russian
economy. Putin can stand up and attribute the recent economic success of Russia
to his dealings with the oligarchs and his national and foreign policies, but
could those successes have been more if he would not have suppressed the
oligarchs? Current U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul has argued that
yes, a democratic Russia would stimulate larger economic successes. McFaul
argues in 2008 thusly:
As Putin and his team devise schemes
to avoid a real handover of power later this year, their contortions to maintain themselves at the head of the
Russian state seem much more successful
than their efforts at improving governance or growing the economy at a faster pace. World energy and raw-material
prices make sustained economic growth in Russia likely for the foreseeable future. But sustained autocratic rule
will not contribute to this growth
and, because of continued poor governance, is likely to serve as a drag on economic development in the long term. Russians
are indeed getting richer, but they could
be getting even richer much faster. (McFaul)
But some dissent,
they argue that having a strong leader in what opponents call a managed
democracy is indeed a good thing. “The myth of Putinism is that Russians are
safer, more secure, and generally living better than in the 1990s -- and that
Putin himself deserves the credit. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the
first goal of "Putin's Plan" (the main campaign document of United
Russia) was to "provide order."”(McFaul). Yet, under Putin terrorist
attacks have increased, health care ratings have decreased, property rights
have been redistributed (McFaul), and of course civil liberties have been
restricted. And since as we have examined he has control of media outlets, therefore
he can filter the statistics which reach the public, but international
observers may have a unique perspective in seeing what really is going on in
Russia.
One such example is Franz Selelmayer.
Sedelmayer has for years attempted to settle debts he believes the Russian
government owes him. He has been largely unsuccessful but through his dealings
with the Kremlin he has learned a great deal about their inner workings. When
asked if he was a Russian protester, what approach would he take? He answered
thusly:
Well, my advice, welcome or
unwelcome, coming from a foreigner with some experience dealing with Putin, is that his biggest weak spot is that he hates
comedy. If anybody wanted to
destabilize Putin, comedy is the best weapon they have. You cannot insult the man, you cannot pressure the man, but you
can ridicule the man.
Have
you ever heard Putin tell a joke? The very first thing he did as Prime Minister
was to cancel the most popular
political satire show. I would describe these as delusions of grandeur, but he cannot live with the
idea that people out there are not taking him seriously.
Putin does not break out into rage unless it is issues like that – it’s his
Achilles heel. (Sedelmayer)
The macho image Putin has made for himself, the man
who goes to mixed martial arts fights and rides horses without a shirt on
cannot stand to see himself made fun of. One could draw a very interesting
parallel to former president Bush and how the American people constantly
ridiculed him and his current image here in the states which has been largely
shaped by that ridicule. It is not easy to picture Putin in the same light. It
may however be good advice for the opposition to listen too. Ridicule Putin,
through humor. The South Parkesque scene is almost palpable. Putin’s fall from
prominence amongst the jokes of those typing away on Twitter and Facebook. But
it is still somewhat hard to fathom that the Russian people would treat Putin
in the same manner that Americans treated Bush. Nevertheless, Sedelmayer does
seem to make a valid and worthwhile point.
We
can look at all this and see how the Russian people, and specifically the
youth, are beginning to grab power from Putin and the oligarchs and are
developing into the power horizontal by means of political protest and usage of
mass media. This will begin to develop over time into a multi party system with
more and more democratic freedom. The opposition must be persistent though. At
this moment in time there is a chance of “a rise of societal activity and political
pluralism. This would enable the media to regain political relevance and
reassume the role of serving the public interest” (Lipman 16). But this
democratic ideal is not solidified yet. The repression could get worse “in
seeking to pre-empt or suppress public protests and political turmoil, the
government may opt for a further crackdown and isolationist, anti-Western
policies” (Lipman 16). If this were to happen it would seem the only possible
recourse would be violence. It seems unlikely with the recent number of
protests that the opposition would die out peacefully. But as Brian Whitmore
has said with Russia everything is changing and nothing is changing. It seems
most likely that what will happen is that over time the culture of the youth
will influence mass media so much that the policies and therefore the
ideologies of the oligarchs and current political elites will simply become too
dated. And when that fully happens the policies of the youth culture which will
likely include democratic ideals will become the ruling system. It is this long
change over time which will prove most effective with brief insertions of
protest and uprising as we have seen over the last several months.
Works
Cited
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